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Abstract
Modeling tools play an important role in identifying threats in tradi-
tional IT systems, where the physical infrastructure and roles are assumed
to be static. In dynamic organizations, the mobility of data outside the
organizational perimeter causes an increased level of threats such as the
loss of confidential data and the loss of reputation. We show that current
modeling tools are not powerful enough to help the designer identify the
emerging threats due to mobility of data and change of roles, because they
do not include the mobility of IT systems nor the organizational dynam-
ics in the security model. Researchers have proposed security models that
particularly focus on data mobility and the dynamics of modern organi-
zations, such as frequent role changes of a person. We show that none
of the current security models simultaneously considers the data mobility
and organizational dynamics to a satisfactory extent. As a result, none
of the current security models effectively identifies the potential security
threats caused by data mobility in a dynamic organization.
1 Introduction
In the last decade three main trends have emerged in the use of information
systems. The first is information omnipresence raised by the increasing usage
of mobile devices. The second trend is the increasing usage of outsourcing.
Organizations gain access to highly trained workforce by becoming decentralized
and by outsourcing whole business processes and departments. The last trend
is the increasing cooperation between organizations. To increase market share,
organizations carry out joint projects with other organizations and extensively
hire part-time consultants.
Information omnipresence increases the risk of attacks that include physical
tampering with mobile devices. Outsourcing and networked organizations are
dynamic, making the distinction of roles in an organization difficult to define
and maintain, which leads to increased risk from social engineering attacks [1].
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Researchers from the industry are aware of the increase of mobility and
the impact mobility has on security [2, 3, 4]. A number of mechanisms, such
as best practices of protecting against laptop theft and protecting information
in laptops are proposed to help the organization mitigate the threats due to
mobility [23, 24, 25, 26]. All of the solutions partially restrict the data mobility
and are based on best practice criteria.
Problem Information omnipresence, outsourcing and cooperation between
organizations increase data mobility and role changes more than ever, making
it increasingly difficult to secure the data.
Contribution We show that threats that arise from mobility of data in
dynamic organization cannot be presented with the existing security modeling
techniques. We define the requirements for an integrated security model and
look in the literature at alternative models of the world that can represent the
mobility of data in a dynamic organization. We analyze state of the art security
models using attack scenarios presented in a case study, show that none of the
new security models consider both of data mobility and organizational dynamics
to a satisfactory extent, and present requirements for an integrated model that
addresses this deficiency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a case
study of current threats that include mobility of objects, interaction between a
person with a machine and interaction between two people. Section 3 introduces
the requirements for an integrated security model of the world that is able to
present the attacks presented in the case study. Section 4 presents the analysis
of current models and shows to which extent the security models satisfy the
requirements of the integrated security model. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Case study
To provide a focus for the analysis, we present a laptop case study. The first
type of attack is based on permanent physical possession of the laptop and
focuses on the confidentiality of the data stored inside. The second type of
attack introduces social engineering as a way to provide access to the laptop
and focuses on the integrity of the data in the laptop.
2.1 Confidentiality of the data in a laptop
If the adversary is in possession of the laptop, the adversary is also in possession
of the encryption keys, making the storage of encryption keys in tamper resistant
hardware crucial. The threat model of a storage device [5, 6] provides a variety
of options for the adversary to consider, such as removal or tampering with
parts of the device. The need for a good protection of the encryption keys has
become widely acknowledged after the coldboot attack [7], which is therefore
worthy of further study.
To present the coldboot attack, we first introduce a simplified example of
presenting encrypted data to a user as shown in Figure 1. The snapshot is taken
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from the Microsoft Threat and Analysis Modeling tool (TAM) and modified (e.g.
numbers are added to present the sequence of the calls), to give a better overview
of the example. The user presents to the operating system a key coupled with a
Figure 1: Coldboot attack
request that defines the data the user wants to read (1). The operating system
forwards the request to the hard drive (2) and recovers the encrypted data (3).
Then, the encrypted data together with the key is loaded into the RAM (4).
From the RAM the data is fed into the processor (5), which as a result returns
the plain text (6). The plain text is then sent to the user through the operating
system (7,8). In the coldboot attack, the adversary does not target the hard
drive with the sensitive information, but the RAM where the encryption keys
are stored. When it is not possible to boot the computer from another media,
the adversary physically transfers the RAM to another computer, and dumps
the memory on a hard drive. Later, the adversary has all the time needed to
use search algorithms on the dumped memory to get the encryption keys.
2.2 Rootkit attacks on a laptop using social engineering
Stealing a laptop provides an instantaneous benefit to the adversary. However,
installing malware that sends data periodically from the internal network of the
organization to the adversary is more dangerous. To infect the network, the
adversary needs to combine social engineering with malicious software such as
rootkits[27], making the mobile device an excellent carrier of the malicious soft-
ware. There are several ways an adversary can use to install a rootkit [27] on a
laptop. The term road apple refers to an apple that is found on a road, tempting
the finder to take it. In the IT world, the apple is usually an infected generic
dongle(ex. USB stick) with the logo of the organization left by the adversary in
a social place of the organization, such as a cafeteria. When an employee finds
the dongle he may be tempted to plug the dongle into his laptop [28]. In the
rest of the paper we call this case road apple 1.
Another approach by the adversary to realize the road apple attack is through
direct interaction with the employee. For example, the adversary impersonates
higher level management and builds a trust relationship with the employee. The
adversary provides a fake identity and simulates an emergency, asking to send
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a file he has on a dongle through the laptop of the employee. If the employee
plugs the dongle on the laptop, the dongle will install the rootkit without the
employee’s knowledge [8].In the rest of the paper we call this case road apple 2.
3 Integrated security model of the world
When an adversary tries to compromise a system, the adversary uses all available
resources, which besides digital penetration include physical possession of a
device and usage of social means to acquire sensitive information. To model
the coldboot attack and physical tampering with devices, we need to be able
to model the tamper resistance of components in a laptop. We also need to
present the removal/addition of components in the laptop. The road apple
attack, as many other social engineering attacks [1] relies on activities occurring
in the digital, physical and social world. Thus, we need a model which presents
movement and roles, as well as physical and digital objects.
The digital, social and physical aspects are defined by Wieringa [9] and we
quote his definitions below:
The physical world is the world of time, space, energy and mass mea-
sured by kilograms, meters, second, Amperes, etc. The social world
is the world of conventions, money, commercial transactions, busi-
ness processes, job roles, responsibility, accountability, etc. struc-
tured in terms of conceptual models shared by people. At the in-
terface between the social and physical worlds we have the digital
world which consists of symbols that have a meaning for people.
Here we provide requirements of an integrated security model of the world
from the digital, social and physical aspect, together with the basic building
blocks the model needs to include.
The requirements we want an integrated security model to achieve are:
1. The model should be capable of representing the data of interest.
2. The model should be capable of representing the physical objects in which
the data resides.
3. The model should be capable of representing the roles a user can have.
4. The model should define the interactions between the data, physical objects
and the roles.
The first three requirements present the digital, physical and social aspect of
the world, while the last binds them together. Following the requirements and
the definitions of the physical, digital and social aspect, elements of interest in
the integrated security model are: data, physical objects, roles and interaction
relations.
From the digital aspect represented by the data, we believe that the inte-
grated model needs to present the data at rest as well as data in movement. The
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spatial/temporal characteristic provides information about the movement of the
objects which is needed to model the attacks presented in Section 2. To present
tampering with a device, the model should be capable of presenting the physical
properties of an object including the boundary of the object. From the social
aspect we are interested in the transition of one role to another, as well as the
interaction between roles. Through role interaction and role transition we can
represent the impersonation of an adversary and adversary’s direct interaction
with an employee as presented in Section 2.2.
A model that will enable a security expert to observe the level of security
of mobile data in dynamic organizations will give the security expert better
insight in the threats and attack vectors, leading to an understanding of what
kind of threat mitigation the security expert needs to implement. An integrated
security model of the world will be a testbed for the effectiveness of the proposed
mitigations.
To predict the behavior of a system over time we need a state based model.
Schneider [10] argues that a static model cannot enforce security policies be-
cause the capability of a user can change over time. Goguen [11] presents a
capability state model to present dynamic changes in the system, and based
on the changes of the capability of a user, defines dynamic security policies.
Goguen uses predicates defined over the sequences of operations used to reach
the current state, instead of using a predicate on a single state.
4 Security models
Motivated by the examples of attacks described in section 2 we did an exhaustive
literature search for models that are capable of presenting the attacks from the
case study. The list of models we present here is not exhaustive due to the page
limit. However, the models that we could not present fully are briefly discussed
in the related work section. Most of the models we found focus on modeling
the data from the digital aspect (e.g. data flow) and only a limited number of
models consider the location of the data. To the best of our knowledge there is
no integrated security model which includes all three aspects (digital, physical,
social), and thus there is no model that can truthfully represent the security
implications on data mobility in dynamic organizations.
We focus on models from the computer science domain modeling a security
property of the system, such as privacy or confidentiality. TAM and Secure
Tropos (ST) (Subsection 4.1) are static and used in the software industry for
generation of threats for a specific software application. Then we move into
dynamic, state based security models (Subsections 4.3 and 4.4) that include
mobility of the components in the system. These dynamic models are all inspired
by the ambient calculus [12], for which we provide the basic structure. Later
we explore how ambient calculus is extended to focus on different properties of
the world in two other security models. We analyze the characteristics of these
models with respect to the requirements presented in section 3. A detailed
analysis is presented in the extended version of the report [13].
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4.1 TAM and Secure Tropos
One of the first steps when looking at a security issue is to create a threat
model [14]. To generate the threats, the threat model needs to provide a security
model of the system on which it runs the threat generation algorithm. Here
we consider TAM [29] which is a state of the art tool used for internal threat
generation and analysis in software development organizations, as well as Secure
Tropos, a formal model used for high level presentation of software requirements.
In Figure 1 we use the TAM to model the coldboot attack. Besides being able
to model data structures and data flow the tool also presents physical objects as
well as roles. TAM considers the physical component and the role as static and
the data as dynamic, allowing the TAM threat generation algorithm to focus on
the flow of data. Although this reasoning is understandable and valid in software
modeling, in the presented attacks TAM proves to be restrictive. TAM does not
take into consideration the possibility that a component can be removed, such
as the RAM in the coldboot attack nor that a component is mobile, such as the
dongle in the road apple attack.
TAM presents neither role interaction nor role transition. Because of the
lack of states, even with manipulation of the relationships and entities in the
model, TAM cannot present interaction between roles and role transition. The
role in TAM is used to describe the privileges over a component in an access
control table, but does not define transition between roles such as escalation
of privileges between a normal and an administrator role nor any interaction
between roles, such as delegation or separation of duty. As a result, TAM
cannot present the road apple attack where the adversary has direct interaction
with the employee.
TAM cannot present physical properties of a component. A component is
defined through the service type the component provides and the data and roles
the component interacts with. Since TAM does not consider the component
as a physical object, the component’s resistance to physical attacks cannot be
expressed in the model.
We can change the meaning of the components to present the attacks from
the case study, but not without changing or blurring the relationship between
the components. We can ”attach” a new operating system to the RAM. As the
number of mobile components increases the number of such ”attachments” also
increases, degrading the model usability as well as blurring the meaning of the
relationship between components. Still TAM model ”attachments” are used in
modeling the coldboot attack as presented in Figure 1.
A similar approach is used in Secure Tropos[20], a formal model based on
the static notions of ownership, trust and delegation. Secure Tropos is not state
based, inheriting the same limitations as TAM, such as inability of dynamic
change of roles and role interactions. Secure Tropos does not present spatial
information, disabling the model to present physical threats such as tampering
or mobility.
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4.2 Ambient calculus
Ambient calculus [12] provides an excellent apparatus for modeling a world with
mobile components. The calculus is capable of presenting spatial and temporal
properties of a component(with running processes inside) in the model and is
Turing complete. Ambient calculus serves as an inspiration for the state of the
art security models that consider mobility of components.
Ambient calculus does not define the properties of an entity nor the rela-
tionship between entities, making the calculus generic enough to present any
model of interest. The calculus presents a comprehensive theoretical framework
for reasoning about mobility. But, without additional formal naming conven-
tion and definition of the properties of interest in the component, cannot be
directly implemented in any model on which mechanisms such as policies or
threat generation algorithms need to be applied.
Ambient calculus cannot present tampering with a device. In ambient cal-
culus data decides to leave the device or not based on the capability of the data,
which is not the case when an adversary tampers with a device. Although tam-
per resistance can be presented through a stack of ambients, the manipulation
of the stack cannot be done at run time, because any rearrangement or removal
of a layer requires a dynamic change of the capabilities of the data inside.
4.3 Scott’s model
Scott [15] builds a security model of the world by addinga spatial relationship
between the elements in the ambient calculus. Scott’s model is based on a
building block called an entity. An entity is a spatial location. Every entity
belongs to only one of six defined sorts. To distinguish physical entities from
digital entities, Scott defines a context, a physical/virtual machine capable of
running code. Scott’s model uses capabilities from ambient calculus (in/out)
and renames the capabilities depending on which entity uses the capability. If
the entity is a person moving between rooms, the capabilities are walk in/walk
out. If the entity is a person interacting with a laptop, the capability is pick
up/put down. If the entity is an agent moving between contexts, the capabilities
are emit/receive.
To present tamper resistance of an entity, we can add multiple layers of
protection to the data by inserting additional entities. But the definition of the
emit/receive command teleports an entity from source address to destination
address without taking in account the layers in between, making the model
oblivious to the tamper resistance imposed by the device.
There is no social factor in the model of Scott. There is a sort person,
but the meaning is spatial. The only capability this entity has is to pick up or
put down a mobile entity. Through this we could present the coldboot attack,
where the person physically changes the location of the RAM as well as the first
version of the road apple attack. But the model cannot represent the direct
interaction between the adversary and the employee in the second version of
the road apple attack, where the adversary directly interacts with the employee
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and convinces the employee to insert the dongle. Thus, the model cannot fully
present the road apple attack.
4.4 Dragovic’s model
Dragovic [16] presents a security model of the world by expanding Scott’s model
and focusing on exposure treats. The main building blocks are data object, which
presents a collection of data with equal sensitivity as determined by a security
policy and container, which is an ambient (digital or physical) containing a data
object or a lower level container. In a Dragovic model, the container has as a
boundary that protects the container or data object inside from the outside in-
fluences with variable degree of success. Every container propagates downwards
its own influences in addition to the influences the container inherits from the
parent container. Boundary transparency is defined based on the degree of pro-
tection the parent container offers to the child container. Dragovic uses class
(similar to Scott’s sort) to group elements. Another distinction is made by
adding a type to the container, which presents the behavior of the container
when exposed to an influence from the environment. Mobility of the data is
presented by four operations: enter, leave, migrate, which atomically binds the
previous two operators and state_update, which is used to update the status of
the attributes of a container. The model presented by Dragovic [17, 16] besides
considering the spatial/temporal characteristics of the object, considers the ob-
ject’s physical properties, such as the object’s capability to resist influences
from the surrounding environment, making the model suitable for presenting
the tamper resistance of a device.
The model of Dragovic includes Scott’s model with the addition of the phys-
ical property of the objects, as well as the definition of sensitivity of data,
allowing us to model tampering with a device and the coldboot attack to a level
where all elements are realistically presented. When modeling the coldboot at-
tack, we define the RAM as a container and the encryption key as a data object.
The accessibility of the RAM is defined by the RAM’s transparency in addition
of the laptop’s transparency. Before the coldboot attack, we consider the RAM
as a container with limited tamper resistance. After the RAM is removed from
the laptop, the tamper resistance of the RAM increases due to the degradation
of the data. Thus, we can successfully present the coldboot attack.
Dragovic does not define an object person, therefore there is no defined
interaction between a person and a container. By presenting the employee and
the adversary as containers, we are able to present the movement of the dongle
with the rootkit from the adversary to the employee’s laptop. Yet, we are not
able to present the interaction between the adversary and the employee, where
the employee is convinced to insert the dongle. Thus, we cannot model the road
apple attack with direct interaction.
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4.5 Comparison of the models
This section compares the analyzed modeling approaches. Table 1 presents the
objects and properties of the objects we are interested in the analyzed models.
Aspect Element Property TAM & ST Ambient
calculus
Scott Dragovic
static yes yes yes yesDigital Data
dynamic yes yes yes yes
spatial/temp. no yes yes yesPhysical Ovject
resistance no no no yes
transitions no no no noSocial Role
interactions no yes no no
Table 1: Ability of the models to present digital/physical/social elements
From the presented results, we make the following observations. The ambient
calculus is formal and capable of presenting most of the properties of interest.
Other models impose restrictions on the model enabling them to focus on a
specific area of interest, making the models less general than ambient calculus.
This prevents the models to represent some of the properties of interest. TAM is
incapable of presenting physical or social properties, because the model focuses
on software representation and does not contain states. Scott and Dragovic
cannot present role transition and role interaction because they do not include
any social element in the model.
Table 2 provides an overview of the model’s ability to present tampering
with a physical device, the coldboot attack, as well as the road apple attack
with indirect (road apple 1) and direct (road apple 2) interaction between the
adversary and the user.
Name of attack TAM & ST Ambient calculus Scott Dragovic
Tampering no no no yes
Coldboot partially yes yes yes
Road apple 1 no yes yes yes
Road apple 2 no yes no no
Table 2: Ability of the models to present the case study attacks
Tampering with a device can be presented with the model of Dragovic be-
cause the model can contain information about the property of a device. TAM
does not have this capability, and thus is not able to present the tampering.
The model of Scott can use multiple layers to represent resistance, but the tele-
porting ability of data makes any attempt to represent resistance obsolete. The
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operators in ambient calculus do not support teleporting, enabling the presen-
tation of the tamper resistance through multiple layers. Yet, the capabilities
of the ambient cannot change dynamically based on the change of the layer
structure, preventing the complete presentation of tampering with data.
We are able to present the spatial movement of the dongle from the adver-
sary to the employees laptop, but are not able to present the social interaction
between the adversary and the user, where the adversary convinces the user to
plug the dongle. This is the reason why Scott and Dragovic can only partially
model the road apple with direct interaction.
5 Related work
Jiang et al. [18, 19] present a data structure for the privacy issues in the ubiqui-
tous computing through data structures called information spaces. The model
of Jiang et al. focuses on presenting social groups and activities, which is a
major improvement with respect to the previously introduced security models,
but the definition of the model is informal, making the model open for interpre-
tation. Prayogi et al. [21] provide an access control framework for selective role
transition based on the change of the context in which the system resides. Social
and business fields have great interest in modeling user interaction, either for
learning about their behavior or for generating policies that optimize profit [22].
6 Conclusion
We analyze the capability of state of the art security models to present the treats
arising from mobility of data in dynamic organizations. We show that none of
the state of the art security models simultaneously consider the data mobility
and organizational dynamics to a satisfactory extent. Software modeling tools,
like Microsoft’s TAM, consider the physical infrastructure and roles to be static
and this makes it hard to present dynamic changes in the system. Security
models for ubiquitous computing are state based, but focus on spatial/temporal
characteristics and fail to recognize social interactions, which are vital for social
engineering threats. As a result, we conclude that none of the presented state of
the art security models effectively identifies the potential security threats caused
by data mobility in a dynamic organization.
The information omnipresence and dynamic organizations shift the stress
from mainly digital attacks to a combination of digital, physical and social
attacks. To cope with the threats, the paper presents the requirements for an
integrated state based model. The goal of the proposed requirements is to aid
in defining a model of the world from all three aspects, digital, physical and
social and realistically present the possible attacks. The paper identifies the
objects of interest from all three aspects and presents an initial classification of
the properties affecting the security of the identified objects.
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Future work is to define a formal security model that satisfies the require-
ments provided here and to define the interactions between the identified objects,
based on the properties of the objects. An interesting direction is to use the
properties of the objects presented in the model of Dragovic and extend it with
roles to cover the social aspect of the world.
Acknowledgements
We thank Roel Wieringa, Siv Hilde Houmb, and André van Cleeff for their help
with the paper. This research is supported by the Sentinels program of the
Technology Foundation STW, applied science division of NWO and the tech-
nology programme of the Ministry of Economic Affairs under project number
TIT.7628
References
Papers
[1] K.D. Mitnick and W.L. Simon. The Art of Deception: Controlling the
Human Element of Security. Wiley, 2002.
[2] D. Lacey. Inventing the future–the vision of the Jericho forum. Information
Security Technical Report, 10:186–188, 2005.
[3] G. Palmer. De-perimeterisation: Benefits and limitations. Information
Security Technical Report, 10:189–203, 2005.
[4] J. Walker. The extended security perimeter. Information Security Tech-
nical Report, 10:220–227, 2005.
[5] R. Hasan, S. Myagmar, A. J. Lee, and W. Yurcik. Toward a threat model
for storage systems. In 1st ACM Workshop on Storage Security and Sur-
vivability (StorageSS), pages 94–102. ACM Press, Nov 2005.
[6] L. Chen, D. Feng, and L. Ming. The security threats and corresponding
measures to distributed storage systems. In LNCS, volume 4847, pages
551–559. Springer, 2007.
[7] J.A. Halderman, S.D. Schoen, N. Heninger, W. Clarkson, W. Paul, J.A.
Calandrino, A.J. Feldman, J. Appelbaum, and E.W. Felten. Lest we re-
member: Cold boot attacks on encryption keys. USENIX Security, pages
45–60, 2008.
[8] M. AlZarouni. The reality of risks from consented use of usb devices.
In C. Valli and A. Woodward, editors, Proceedings of the 4th Australian
Information Security Conference, pages 5–15, 2006.
11
[9] R. Wieringa. Conceptual modeling in social and physical contexts. Tech-
nical Report TR-CTIT-08-40, Centre for Telematics and Information Tech-
nology, University of Twente, 2008.
[10] F. B. Schneider. Enforceable security policies. ACM Trans. on Informa-
tion and System Security, 3(1):30–50, Feb 2000.
[11] J. A. Goguen and J. Meseguer. Security policies and security models. In
3rd Symp. on Security and Privacy (S&P), pages 11–20. IEEE Computer
Society, Apr 1982.
[12] L. Cardelli and A.D. Gordon. Mobile ambients. Theoretical Computer
Science, 240(1):177–213, 2000.
[13] T. Dimkov, Q. Tang, and P. Hartel. On the inability of existing security
models to cope with data mobility in dynamic organizations. Technical
Report TR-CTIT-08-57, University of Twente, 2008.
[14] F. Swiderski and W. Snyder. Threat Modeling. Microsoft Press Redmond,
WA, USA, 2004.
[15] D.J. Scott. Abstracting Application-Level Security Policy for Ubiquitous
Computing. PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 2004.
[16] B. Dragovic and J. Crowcroft. Containment: from context awareness to
contextual effects awareness. 2nd Intl Workshop on Software Aspects of
Context (IWSAC’05), 2005.
[17] B. Dragovic and J. Crowcroft. Information exposure control through data
manipulation for ubiquitous computing. In NSPW ’04: Proceedings of the
2004 workshop on New security paradigms, pages 57–64. ACM, 2004.
[18] X. Jiang and J.A. Landay. Modeling privacy control in context-aware
systems. IEEE Pervasive Computing, 1(3):59–63, 2002.
[19] X. Jiang, J.I. Hong, and J.A. Landay. Approximate information flows:
Socially-based modeling of privacy in ubiquitous computing. Proceedings
of Ubicomp, pages 176–193, 2002.
[20] P. Giorgini, H. Mouratidis, and N. Zannone. Modelling security and trust
with secure tropos. Integrating Security and Software Engineering: Ad-
vances and Future Vision, pages 160–189, 2006.
[21] A.A. Prayogi, J. Park, and E. Hwang. Selective role assignment on dynamic
location-based access control. Convergence Information Technology, 2007.
International Conference on, pages 2136–2135, 21-23 Nov. 2007.
[22] W.R. Hartmann, P. Manchanda, H. Nair, M. Bothner, P. Dodds, D. Godes,
K. Hosanagar, and C. Tucker. Modeling social interactions: Identification,
empirical methods and policy implications. Marketing Letters, forthcom-
ing, 2007.
12
Web references
[23] J. Ryder. Laptop security, part one: Preventing laptop theft. SecurityFo-
cus, July 2001. http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1186.
[24] J. Ryder. Laptop security, part two: Preventing information loss. Securi-
tyFocus, August 2001. http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1187.
[25] B. Rudis. Protecting road warriors: Managing security for mobile users ,
part one. http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1777, April 2004.
[26] B. Rudis. Protecting road warriors: Managing security for mobile users ,
part two. http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1781, May 2004.
[27] A. Shah. Analysis of rootkits: Attack approaches and detection mecha-
nisms. http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~salkesh/files/RootkitsReport.
pdf, 2006.
[28] S. Stasiukonis. Social engineering the usb way. http://www.darkreading.
com/document.asp?doc_id=95556, 2006.
[29] Microsoft. Microsoft threat analysis and modeling v2.1.2. http://msdn.
microsoft.com/en-us/security/aa570413.aspx, 2007.
13
